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Transformation of the European security system during the 1990s

1. The collapse of political divisions in Europe

During the time of the Cold War division of Europe the international security system on our continent rested upon two basic institutions of group security – NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the late 1980s, when the political system of real socialism collapsed in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the process of disintegration of the Eastern Block, followed by that of the USSR, began.

Decisive in putting this process in motion were the ideas of “glasnost” and “perestroika” introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the spring of 1985, which became the generating force behind the changes in the Soviet Union¹. The role of the democratic opposition in Poland (revealed especially in the years 1980–1981) as well as the reformist political course of the leaders of the ruling parties in Poland and Hungary should also be noted. These factors became the decisive force behind democratic change which during the 1989 autumn events enabled the earlier than previously forecasted unification of Germany, and later started the process of erosion and disintegration of international structures of the Eastern Bloc.

The new democratic governments of Central European countries completely redirected their foreign policies; the Moscow-oriented policies of their predecessors were switched to pro-Western ones, where in the institutions of the Western system they sought guarantees for their countries' security. The countries, which by their own assessment at the time had the greatest likelihood of joining those structures, took steps to dismantle the military organisation of the Warsaw Pact (led by Hungary and Czechoslovakia)², and once this was accom-

¹ Cf., R.H. Ullman, *Securing Europe*, Princeton 1991, pp. 3-22; J. Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security*, New York 1994, pp. 3-21.

² See R. Weltz, *Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe*. In: R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye, S. Hoffmann (eds.), *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Cambridge, Mass., 1993, pp. 362-363; P. Dunay, *Theological Debates on NATO in Hungary*, “Foreign Policy” Vol. 3 (1997), special issue, pp.88-89.

plished as of 1 April 1991, they pressed on for the liquidation of the political alliance. The Warsaw Pact was ultimately dismantled by the decision of the Prague meeting of the heads of states of the six countries signatories on 1 July 1991.

Simultaneously, bilateral alliance treaties made between the countries of the Soviet block during the 1940s and 1960s ceased to apply. Although these treaties were not terminated, because of the new circumstances negotiations were taken up to supersede them by new bilateral agreements of cooperation and friendship, but no longer in the form of the former alliance treaties. During these negotiations, finalised in the first half of the 1990s, the former Central European allies of the USSR intent on joining NATO rejected Moscow's proposal of the so-called enemy clauses, intended to rule out joining or supporting an alliance directed against another party to the pact (the "Kwiciński-Falin doctrine"); only Romania agreed to this proposal and on 5 April 1991 signed the treaty of cooperation, good neighbourly relations and friendship with the USSR³.

Simultaneously with the dismantling of the security system of the former socialist block countries, another, closely connected with it, form of imperial dependence of Central European countries on Moscow was in the process of liquidation. In June 1991 the evacuation of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia was completed, and in November 1993 from Poland⁴. The final touch to the disintegration of the Eastern Block was the decision of 28 June 1991 (which became effective 90 days later) to dissolve the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

It should be noted that the transformation of the political order in Europe began with the revolutionary (in the historical sense, and by its speed) systematic changes in the socialist countries, and its consequence was the change of the institutional form of the international system. This created a very difficult situation for the former socialist countries that having made the political choice near the end of the 1980s to seek freedom, democracy and greatly enhance their chances of achieving prosperity, faced the challenge of providing their own security in the transformed geostrategic situation. This was a serious problem that had to be tackled also in the West. What seriously hindered the decision process in countries in both parts of Europe was the protracted, to some extent secondary, internal destabilization of the countries which took up the task of reforming their political system, and at the same time had to cope with new geopolitical circumstances. At the same time, significant economic disproportions were revealed between individual countries, and large international

³ More in V. Socor, *The Romanian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and Its Regional Implications*. "Report on Eastern Europe" 1991, May 3, pp. 25-33.

⁴ The delay in applying this solution was chiefly due to the fact that Soviet troops remained in the eastern lands of the united German states on the basis of the Moscow Pact of 12 September 1990.

migrations took place. What's more, while "old" security threats persisted, new threats to international security became apparent – nationalisms and ethnic conflicts, military threats, trans-national organized cross-border crime and environmental threats. All these phenomena had a significant impact on redefining the concept of security in the countries of both parts of Europe⁵.

2. A new concept of European security

An evaluation of the changed international security conditions after the reversal of the Cold War division of Europe convinced politicians and European institutions of the need for comprehensive and cooperative security. Comprehensive security is to denote a wide and complex scope of topics, or actions required to eliminate threats and provide the assurance of the existence, functioning and development of all the participants in the international arena; thus, it is based upon the broad understanding of the security of international relations participants propounded in science since the second half of the 1970s. The comprehensive security concept, encompassing all, from its military through environmental and humanitarian aspects was being shaped from the beginning of the 1980s in documents of the Brandt Commission (1980), the Palme Commission (the concept of "common security", 1982), the report of the UN General-Secretary "Study of Security Concepts" (1985), Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of a "common European home" (1987), the report of the Brundtland Commission (1987) as well as at the ensuing scientific conferences organised by both Eastern and Western countries. After the reversal of the Cold War division of Europe members of the former Brandt Commission and other independent study groups developed and passed on 22 April 1991 in the capital of Sweden a document called "The Stockholm Initiative on global security and world order". The document, drawing its conclusions from the analysis of the changed international situation, including the experience of the second Persian Gulf war (the military intervention against Iraq), appealed for the "joint responsibility" of countries for the creation of a new peace order on a global and regional scale; emphasized the necessity of broader international cooperation in combating all threats as well as a wider implementation of requirements of "justice and peace, democracy and development, human rights and international law" as well as the importance of the development of institutional mechanisms for the improvement of peace and security systems, especially the reinforcement and reform of the UN as well as following the

⁵ R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 79–115.

European example in organising regional security and international cooperation systems⁶.

Elements of the comprehensive security concept can be found in the programmes of all institutions and groups active in Europe in the 1990s. However – and this needs to be stressed – concepts of institutions which had survived from the period of the Cold War divided Europe, such as NATO or the Western European Union, focus on the “hard guarantees” of security which rely on the military mechanisms of cooperation in defence and security; similar in concept is the security proposal presented by Russia and the other signatories of the 15 May 1992 Tashkent Treaty. The numerous new sub-regional groups, on the other hand, spread over areas from Africa through the Balkans and the Black Sea (such as, the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, the Baltic Council, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Euro-Arctic Region of the Barents Sea, the Arctic Council and Black Sea Economic Cooperation) focus on the non-military aspects of security, their aims of intensifying security within the areas of their activity closely linked with issues of environmentally friendly economic development and the development of democratic institutions; taking on new challenges posed by our civilisation, they are developing cooperation in such fields as the so-called civil aspects of security, which include fighting organised cross-border crime, environmental protection, counteracting illegal migration etc.

The institution which is making an effort to play a coordinating role for all activity aimed at the strengthening of security in the Euro-Atlantic area is the Organisation for European Security and Cooperation which continues since 1 January 1995 to creatively develop the achievements of CSCE and represents a vision of comprehensive security for a united Europe. The 1994–1999 discussion over the model of European security in the 20th century was in search of the optimum form of a security system, in other words, a functional institutional structure to meet the requirements of a comprehensive security system.

The method of strengthening security, adopted during the 1990s by all institutions and groups in Europe, was broad international cooperation. This cooperation included coping jointly with challenges posed by the accelerated internationalisation of various aspects of national and state issues as well as the elimination of threats to security and the strengthening and development of international security institutionalisation. This method of building European security was practiced internationally in the 1970s by CSCE which postulated wide cooperation – encompassing mainly non-military disciplines – across block divisions. The meeting of the East and West and their cooperation at the CSCE forum, greatly enhanced by the activities of the N+N group, contributed at the

⁶ J. Kukułka, *Narodziny nowych koncepcji bezpieczeństwa*. In: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w Europie Środkowej po zimnej wojnie*. J. Kukułka (ed.), Warszawa 1994, pp. 35–39.

end of the 1980s to the easing of the confrontation between the two blocks and – through persistent raising of democratic standards – hastened the fall of authoritarian regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The strengthening of security by means of international cooperation earned it the name of the cooperative security concept or strategy⁷. In the 1990s this idea caught on not only in CSCE/OSCE political documents but also in those of other European institutions, and called for their joint cooperation in matters of international security. The popularity of this new strategy in Europe is particularly reflected in the propositions of the declaration of the Rome NATO summit of November 1991 on the development of a system of cooperative and mutually complimentary institutions (*interlocking institutions*) in the Euro-Atlantic area as well as the text of the “European Security Charter” passed at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999⁸.

Having accepted the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security for realisation, the European countries determined to consolidate and expand institutions which survived the Cold War divisions, support the development of sub-regional groups and the maintenance of cooperation between all the European structures. They also perceive the achievement of security institutionalisation on the Old Continent through the consolidation of cooperative action in the area of dealing with new security challenges and arising problems, eliminating threats, strengthening stability and providing security through the dynamic process of democratic standards and values becoming universal.

3. The development of a complementary security institutions system

The transformation of the European security system in the 1990s is a process in which states and its other participants are building a new international order based on revitalized bilateral diplomacy and a system of mutually supplementing institutions. The institutional construction of the European order – popularly known as the “security architecture” – is characterised by the following: adaptation of already existing institutions to cope with new challenges and to eliminate threats, the formation of new institutions, the pluralism of security institutions and the development of a new European order based on Western values and institutions. The process of setting up a system of interlocking institutions illustrates a general increase in importance of institutionalisation for the improvement of the rational functioning of the whole international community.

⁷ Cf., J. E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, DC 1994, pp. 3–18, 23–35; M. Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe*, New York 1996, chapters 5–6.

⁸ *Charter for European Security*, Istanbul, November 1999 (source: <http://www.osce.org>).

3.1. Adaptation of already existing institutions to cope with new challenges and to eliminate threats

Institutions established in Europe during the Cold War period were not equipped to deal with new issues which they had to face once the division of the continent collapsed⁹. European states, the United States and Canada as well as post-Russian Asian states resolved to pursue to maintain, adapt to new circumstances and the strengthen the security institutions remaining in existence, i.e. NATO, WEU and CSCE. In each case, however, the arguments justifying the usefulness of these structures varied.^{III}

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO came out the "victorious" group that contributed significantly to the West's victory over the East in their political rivalry. Although in substance it was a military alliance of 16 states of Western Europe and North America, and the enemy ceased to exist at the beginning of the 1990s, new reasons appeared for Western countries to preserve their "tested" security organisation. The chief argument was the destabilisation of the political order in the post-Cold War Europe, deepened by the internal problems of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe undergoing the process of transformation. The necessity arose to find means of stabilising the situation on the European continent. Relatively quickly, the North Atlantic Alliance was recognised by its members, and even quicker by the former socialist countries of Central Europe as the main element in the process of maintaining security in a destabilised Europe. Even Russia, albeit unhappy with the survival NATO, the "relict" of the Cold War era, saw a positive role for the organisation, provided that it refuted its attributes of a military alliance or succumbed to a higher authority of some Pan-European structure, preferably the CSCE/OSCE.

In these circumstances, the identity crisis of the North Atlantic alliance, revealed at the beginning of the 1990s, was relatively quickly overcome. At the Rome summit in November 1991 NATO countries agreed upon a new concept of security which allowed NATO's adaptation to the changed situation in Europe, and in January 1994, after in principle overcoming internal disagreements (focusing around the European Identity of Security and Defence concept) proposed to the remaining European states a far-reaching offer of a Partnership for Peace which enabled the expansion of the Alliance to the countries of Central Europe. At the same time as implementing the concept of building the Common Joint Task Forces (CJTF) NATO began preparations for conducting future military operations, exceeding the tasks provided for under Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty. The direct engagement of NATO, also through

⁹ V. Florent, B. Tétrais, *Les organisations européennes de sécurité sont-elles efficaces?*, "Relations Internationales et Stratégiques" n° 14, été 1994, p. 177.

the USA's engagement in settling conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, is an example of the practical application of the new strategic concept of the Alliance as well as an indication of its preparation to deal with new challenges and eliminating threats to international security in out of treaty areas. This means that a regenerated NATO capable of providing collective defence to its members is at the same time developing as an instrument in solving crises situations, which means that it is aspiring to becoming a collective security instrument¹⁰. Without ceasing to be a military alliance, in practice NATO takes the form of a Pan-European security institution.

Another defence structure of Western states – the Western European Union – set out preparing its own operational capabilities even before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The cause of this was the rising apprehension in Western Europe that the United States would some day withdraw its military presence from Europe leaving its allies to face the threats to their security on their own. For this reason as early as 1984 west European states were working on creating the European Identity of Security and Defence within the framework of NATO, or even – as France would have it – outside the North Atlantic Alliance. WEU – in the period leading to the formation of the European Union, in competition somewhat with NATO – expanded in June 1992 the tasks under Art. V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide for the possibility of conducting peace-keeping operations outside the area of its member states (the Petersburg tasks).

The main aim of the steps taken after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht – designed to strengthen the Western European Union as the future military arm of the European Union – is achieving greater security for the enlarging Western Europe through supplementation of the system of guarantees provided by the North Atlantic Treaty. In this case we are dealing mainly with motives expressing the particular interests of the highly developed countries of Western Europe which are wary of future American engagement in European matters of defence. When work began simultaneously on the development of operational capabilities of WEU, preparations for the Petersburg missions and the development of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policies, an integrated Western Europe was still lacking a clear vision of how to open up to the countries of Central Europe. Countries of the Community/European Union saw the chance for strengthening their group security primarily in the formation of effective mechanisms to eliminate new threats waiting to erupt in the Mediterranean basin and later on in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

¹⁰ Cf., D.S. Yost, *The New NATO and Collective Security*, "Survival" Vol. 40 (1998), No. 2, pp. 150–156; R.L. Russel, *American Security Policy and NATO's Future*, "European Security" Vol. 8 (1999), No. 1, pp. 16–24; M. Mathiopoulos, *The USA and Europe as Global Players in the Twenty-first Century*, "Aussenpolitik" 1998, No. 2, pp. 44–49; Karl-Heinz Kamp, *L'OTAN après le Kosovo: ange de paix ou gendarme du monde?*, "Politique Étrangère" 1999, n° 2, pp. 245–256.

Observation of to-date development of West European security structures shows that its adaptation to the new geostrategic and geopolitical situation is insufficient for dealing with Pan-European matters. The mechanism of cooperation of WEU and EU with the countries in the eastern part of the continent is considerably less developed than the similar mechanism of NATO, although we need to appreciate the importance of the decision of the European Council of December 1997 to start the process of enlargement of the European Union and include the countries of Central Europe (as well as Cyprus); they also open opportunities for these countries to be integrated into the Western European security institutions. The process will take some time and today we know that it had not preceded the process of expanding NATO to its first new members from Central Europe. It seems quite obvious, however, that the further development of the "second pillar" of the EU and its future expansion over a larger area will assist in solving, through integration, new challenges to security policies of member states as well as threats to international security¹¹. Aware of this are the EU leaders who decided on strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Amsterdam Treaty and at the Cologne summit in June 1999 announced the integration of WEU into the EU by the end of the year 2000¹².

Observing the internal transformation and the adaptation of both western military structures (NATO and WEU) to new security conditions in Europe, one can draw the conclusion that they are changing in character, they are evolving from traditional military alliances into security institutions with a wider range of activity, providing "services" on behalf of the UN and OSCE. This may lead in the future to NATO losing (and prevent the EU from achieving) superiority in the European security system. Supporting this concept is the tendency of the decreasing usefulness of military power in Europe due to the emergence of new non-military threats to state security and growing international interdependence¹³.

The third security structure adapted to European post-Cold War reality is the CSCE. This is equally the effect of actions of both Western and Eastern countries. In the aftermath of the 1989 autumn events the new governments of countries in the eastern part of the continent, having in vain waited for an invitation to join NATO, turned to CSCE as a means of strengthening their pro-European and pro-Atlantic options in their foreign policies, weakening at the same time the Warsaw Pact. One shouldn't forget that many politicians in the

¹¹ T. Taylor, *Security for Europe*. In: H. Miall (ed.), *Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation*, London 1994, p.181.

¹² Documents from the European Council meeting in Cologne, see: *Politique Étrangère* 1999, n° 2, pp. 242-243.

¹³ Compare B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton 1983, p. 253.

former socialist countries were active dissidents before 1989 and much of their opposition activity had been inspired by the norms of the Helsinki process¹⁴.

Because at that time the CSCE was a relaxed process, more a discussion and negotiating forum without fixed structures, the need to strengthen it institutionally arose. At the beginning of the 1990s this specific institution-process engaging virtually all European countries and the USA and Canada received unprecedented support also from Western countries which preferred at the time not to engage their group institutions in matters of Central and East European countries¹⁵. The euphoria accompanying the democratic changes after the 1989 autumn events convinced states in the West as well as the East, at the Paris summit in November 1990, to take up the task of the structural institutionalisation of CSCE which, due to its fast development, evolved as of 1 January 1995 into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The OSCE as the most expansive structure today, with 55 members, including all European countries, successors to the USSR, and also the USA and Canada, has at its disposal extensive mechanisms to implement the so-called soft security guarantees, continues its role of the main centre of political consultation, establishing international standards and promoting democratic principles¹⁶. This organisation continues its efforts to adapt to take on new challenges and threats in international relations. Although when confronted with drastic threats to peace and international security it remains as an institution ineffective, nevertheless in European post-Cold War reality the necessity to maintain and strengthen many of its mechanisms of cooperation for security remains. OSCE works in close cooperation with the other European institutions: NATO, WEU, EU, European Council, as well as sub-regional groups. This illustrates that it is an important and needed element in the whole "security architecture" in Europe. It would be very difficult to envision the implementation of the cooperative security concept without OSCE, an organisation which emerged due to the consistent realisation of the cooperation strategy since the beginning of the 1970s overcoming the then divisions of Europe. After the 1989 autumn of events we notice greatly improved conditions for the pursuit of relations of a more cooperative nature; CSCE, and later OSCE – adapted to them perfectly, and what's more, the cooperative security concept was taken up by other international institutions and European countries.

¹⁴ Compare R. Weitz, *Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe*. In: R.O. Keobane, J. Nye, S. Hoffman (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 346–347.

¹⁵ For more see: J.S. Nye, R.O. Keobane, *The United States and International Institutions in Europe after the Cold War*; S. Hoffmann, *French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New Europe*; L. Richardson, *British Strategies after the Cold War*, *ibidem*, pp. 104–126, 127–147, 148–169.

¹⁶ For more see: V.-Y. Ghibali, *L'OSCE dans l'Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996. Vers une identité paneuropéenne de sécurité*, Bruxelles 1996.

The cautious expansion of western integration and politico-military organisations as well as the rejection by NATO or EU, as well as Central European states, of the possibility of Russia and other CIS nations joining them, enhances OSCE's character as the broadest forum and the only structure which groups on formally equal terms all states in the European and Atlantic area, including the super powers. A review of the structure's operations during the 1990s indicates that more often than not the decisive voice is that of the USA, the European Union and Russia. This raises questions among Europeans whether OSCE could become dominated by the super powers and its effectiveness dependent in the future on the development of relations between them, oscillating between cooperation and confrontation¹⁷.

Watching the adaptation process of existing European and Euro-Atlantic institutions to new challenges and threats to international security it is not hard to observe that it is a slow process. All the security organisations require time to adapt their structures, just as countries need time to draw conclusions from the changed geostrategic situation in Europe¹⁸. At the start of the 21st century it is apparent that the process entered its advanced stage.

3.2. The formation of new institutions

The collapse of the two-block security system in Europe opened opportunities to many new forms of multilateral cooperation of states in their approach to new challenges and threats in international relations. The result was the formation and development of numerous sub-regional groups, such as the Central European Initiative and the Arctic Council, and in the territory of the former USSR – a specific regional structure which is the Commonwealth of Independent States.

None of the new sub-regional groups intend to become leading security organisations but instead provide, first of all, a forum for regular consultations among states; as such, they form special, more or less formal channels, as well as personal ties enabling communication, which can be and are taken advantage of in prevention diplomacy and crisis diffusion. Sub-regional groups play an important role in initiating multilateral cooperation among states, and at times at the level of local self-governments, in the field of dealing with new challenges emerging from the positive and negative internationalisation of various aspects of social life, including the elimination of "new types of risk", such as: terror-

¹⁷ Cf., W. Schütze, *Promises and Predicaments of European Security at the End of the Century*, "Peace and Security" Vol. 29 (1997), p. 18.

¹⁸ Cf., P. Bouiface, *Quelle efficacité des organisations internationales de sécurité?*, «Relations Internationales et Stratégiques» n° 14, été 1994, p. 160 ; F. Bozo, *Organisations de sécurité et insécurité en Europe*, «Politique Étrangère» 1993, n° 2, pp. 447-458.

ism, organised cross-border crime, narcotics smuggling, ecological and industrial disasters, problems associated with the refugee problem and uncontrolled migration. These groups supplement the organisations capable of providing "hard guarantees" of security, represent a new element in European security institutionalisation, called by British authors a model of "non-security but pro-security" organisations, contributing to the easing of international tensions and garnering the interest of its participants for the mutual concern for their national survival and welfare¹⁹. They also play a wide role in neutralising the leftovers of a divided Europe, and most of all they play the role of a catalyst in the development of a new international order²⁰.

Sub-regional groups in the western part of the European continent represent structures of different, generally of a low degree of institutionalisation of multilateral ties. Very often they overlap, and some countries, Scandinavian countries for instance, are members of more than one group. Similar agendas of those structures, as well as their interdependence being the effect of their close geographical proximity encourage political contacts, mutual support and sector cooperation, such as environmental protection or fighting cross-border crime. New groups do not compete with the "old" or broader European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Quite the contrary, they actively cooperate with them, which is especially evident in their relations with OSCE and European economic and financial institutions (the European Union, UN-ECE, EBRD, European Investment Bank).

Established at the end of 1991 the new integrational structure of post-Soviet states – the Commonwealth of Independent States – is also expanding its cooperation with European institutions; in the field of security, it cooperates with OSCE as well as the UN, especially in the field of peacekeeping missions in conflict areas. CIS as a new multilateral organisation composed of twelve former Soviet republics, although still in pursuit of its own identity and lacking efficient mechanisms of cooperation to provide security, it "manages" a huge geopolitical area where numerous challenges and threats are "waiting to erupt", unable to undertake solving them any more than eliminating them, institutions established in a Western style or of a Pan-European character²¹. So, although international controversies persist over the dominant role played by Russia in the CIS security mechanism, to date there hasn't even been an outline worked out of a uniform system (in terms of organisation) that would encompass the whole Euro-Atlantic area, which would provide for better solu-

¹⁹ I. Bremmer, A. Bailes, *Sub-regionalism in the Newly Independent States*, "International Affairs" Vol. 74 (1998), No. 1.

²⁰ Compare A. Freiherr Freytag von Lorringen, *Regional Cooperation: Building Bridges as Europe Grows Together*, "Aussenpolitik" 1998, No. 1, pp. 12–17.

²¹ For more see R. Zięba, *Mechanizm bezpieczeństwa Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw*, "Polityka Wschodnia" 1998, No. 1, pp. 61–84.

tions, applicable also in the very destabilised regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, additionally threatened with the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan and Iran.

3.3. Pluralism of security institutions

The to-date development of the process of institutionalisation of European security brought about significant pluralism of institutions active in this field of international relations. This inclines some authors to maintain that there is no international order in Europe²². It should not be overlooked, however, that this differentiation of institutions reflects the new approach of states to new challenges and threats to their security and international stability. The wide range of these phenomena, their regional nature and varied intensity and dynamics in particular parts of Europe justify the number of institutional security mechanisms, but also intensify the tendency of their acting jointly²³. On the other hand, institutional pluralism does not facilitate reaching a consensus in Pan-European matters. We can then ask whether there is a need to build one Pan-European structure to provide a forum to seek such a consensus if it can be worked out within the mechanisms already existing, such as the OSCE, the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NATO – Russia Permanent Joint Council etc. Countries engaged in the European security strengthening process and their multilateral structures have not yet advanced to the point at which they could make the decision to establish one superstructure.

The result of the discussion at the OSCE forum on a security model for Europe in the 21st century, concluded at the Istanbul summit (18–19 November 1999) indicated the triumph of the view that pluralism, complementary and overlapping as well as closely interacting security institutions should be maintained in the nearest future. The common concern is, first of all, to continue improving cooperation between the institutions.

²² O. Tunander, *Post-Cold War Europe: Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend-Foe Structure on a Hierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Structure?*. In: O. Tunander, P. Baev, V.I. Einagel (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe; Security, Territory and Identity*, London 1997, p.35. For more see S. Duke, *The New European Security Disorder*, New York 1994.

²³ A.G.V. Hyde-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010*, London 1991, pp. 249–251. Compare J. Roper, *Collective Security and Collective Defense in Europe*. In: E. Remacle, R. Seidelmann (eds.), *Pan-European Security Redefined*, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 95, 105.

3.4. The development of a new order in Europe based on Western values and institutions

In conditions of post-Cold War pluralism, political concepts of leading Western countries – constantly developed and firmly set in strong international structures – quickly came to the forefront. In spite of the identity crisis that the Northern Alliance experienced and disagreements on the further progress of Western European enlargement, leading positions in the new European order were taken by NATO and the European Union. This was due not only to the strength of both structures, but also to their attractiveness to the remaining European states. The cries in Central European countries of “returning to Europe” mark their desire to join both of those organisations. The gradual expansion of Western structures has the support of the United States which after the Cold War formulated the “great strategy of institutionalisation”. This strategy – as expressed by Kim Edward Spiezio – has as its aim the easing in the long term of changes in the nature of the European state system, and “in practice aims at expanding to all parts of the continent a serious transformation which had taken place in Western Europe during the Cold War. And finally, it is devised to enable the creation of a liberal international society in Europe, which will ensure continuous peace and prosperity in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic region”²⁴.

The new international order building process in Europe is taking place based on values represented by the West, such as: human rights, democracy, market economy, democratic principles in international relations. Because these values are best represented and defended by institutions of the western world, the role of NATO and the European Union (including WEU) is visibly increasing in the development of a new security order in Europe. The Central European states aspiring to those organisations consent to this, Russia undergoing democratisation also accepts the system of political values of the West, and this improves Pan-European cooperation in matters of security.

As seen on the example of post-Cold War Europe, democratic values play a very important role in international relations today. This has not escaped the attention of, among others, representatives of a neo-liberal trend in science, who stress the many advantages of the expansion of these values and institutions. However, it is wrong to minimize or ignore difficulties of advancing democratisation. As the American scientist, quoted earlier, observes rightly – “While it is true that democracies rarely resort to war among each other, it is altogether not clear whether they can cooperate in the development of international security”²⁵.

²⁴ K.E. Spiezio, *Beyond Containment: Reconstructing European Security*, Boulder, Colo. 1994, p. 33.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p.135.

4. Strengthening of security in the Euro-Atlantic region

4.1. International situation stability

All European security institutions, whether originating in the block integration of Western states, OSCE or CIS and new sub-regional groups, all contribute in a concrete way to the stability of the international situation in Europe and neighbouring regions. Their activity comes in the form of preventive diplomacy, crises solving efforts and peacekeeping in the aftermath of armed conflicts. The efforts, although in different degrees, are undertaken by all security structures operating in Europe, depending on the resources at their disposal. The most frequent tasks deal with the building of trust between nations, finding solutions to the growing internal conflicts (mainly national issues) and disputes between states. The means applied are from the group of "soft guarantees" of security. There have, however, been cases of using by Western security institutions (NATO and WEU) as well as by CIS of "hard guarantees" of security, which is sending their troops to regions of conflict to oversee compliance with embargo restrictions imposed on the sides of the armed conflict, respect of ceasefires or conducting mediatory operations. In 1994 NATO began conducting military operations as it became engaged in the prolonged armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after achieving a peace agreement ending this war, the North Atlantic Alliance became the organiser of international peacekeeping forces IFOR and SFOR. It should be noted that the first NATO and WEU military operations in their out of treaty area (as they remain military alliances) had the support of the remaining European states, including Russia; they also had the backing of OSCE and authorisation in the form of a UN mandate. Operation "Allied Force", the other hand, conducted by NATO during 24 March – 10 June 1999 against Yugoslavia did not have the mandate of the UN Security Council²⁶ and was condemned by Russia and China. Efforts aimed at restoring and maintaining peace at the end of a conflict, as a rule, were taken up after persistent application of the "soft measures" of maintaining and restoring peace. Russia, too, with the support of other CIS states, deployed its troops to maintain and restore peace in Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.

Maintaining international stability and strengthening security is achieved through the participation of various European institutions. During this process, not only the practical implementation of the cooperative security concept, represented or accepted by all European institutions is executed, but also the nature and the international role of multilateral military alliances is undergoing

²⁶ Cf., M. Waldenberg, *Kosowo*. In: *NATO w systemie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*. Work edited by E. Cziomer. Kraków 1990, p. 179.

change. In the 1990s, NATO and the Western European Union underwent an internal transformation which helped them take up new tasks exceeding the provisions of the Treaty of Washington and Brussels (containing *casus foederis* clauses) and normally associated with collective security organisations. The Tashkent Treaty signed by several CIS states also carries provisions normally associated with military alliances and collective security agreements. However, its full evaluation is not possible, as the proposed system is not effective as a multilateral agreement in practice, but more as an instrument of Russia's security policy in its "nearest neighbourhood".

In general, it needs to be said that all international institutions and structures operating in Europe contribute to the strengthening of international security in the European-Atlantic area, and in their practice and cooperation they establish new forms of operation, cooperation and in the process develop their own mechanisms of work and cooperation with their partners. Their operation reinforces the development of European security institutionalisation.

4.2. Asymmetry of security guarantees in the region and the development of a new partnership balance

Watching the to-date effects of institutionalisation it should be stated that this process has not eliminated the asymmetry of the real status and the sense of security between Western Europe and Central or Eastern Europe. The main threats to security remain in the area of the former socialist states which, unlike western countries, do not have institutions capable of applying "hard" guarantees of security. The security system of the nine CIS states in the form of the Tashkent Treaty is far from being as effective as that of the North Atlantic Alliance or even the Western European Union. Most countries of Central and Eastern Europe can rely solely on "soft" guarantees of security offered by OSCE and make use of the mechanisms of consultation and sector cooperation in the scope of some of the civil aspects of security provided by the various sub-regional groups.

Since in the former socialist countries there is a strong sense of remaining in a type of "grey" area of diminished security, the politicians of most of those countries seek the expansion of western structures. The Central European countries are determined to join NATO while Ukraine is working within a broad bilateral cooperation framework with the Alliance. All former socialist countries, including members of CIS, cooperate with NATO within the framework of the European-Atlantic Partnership Council and participate in the Partnership for Peace programme.

Practically all Central and Eastern European countries (perhaps with the exception of authoritarian Belarus) are interested in becoming a member or entering partnership cooperation with the European Union. It needs to be remembered also that closer relations with the EU imply their cooperation in

the scope of political and military aspects of security within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and WEU. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland gained in the spring of 1999 the associated membership of WEU and seven of the remaining Central European countries cooperate with this organisation in their status of associated partners.

It is, furthermore, clear that in spite of Russia's efforts to create a regional security organisation on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty, the great attractiveness of western integration structures inclines CIS countries towards cooperation with those structures. A motivating factor behind this is their concern about slipping back under Russia's dominance, as it is revealing intentions of returning to its imperial policies in its "closest neighbourhood". All this, compounded by the weakness and insufficient effectiveness of OSCE, is the reason for NATO and the European Union (including WEU) to be considered two fundamental pillars of the developing cooperative security system in Europe.

Social perception of threats to the security of nations and states as well as the asymmetry of institutional mechanisms for their elimination also favours the strengthening and enlargement eastwards of Western structures. This automatically slows down the reinforcement of OSCE as a Pan-European institution and, thus, makes it very unlikely for it to evolve – in line with the Russian concept²⁷ – into a superior security structure in the new European order. OSCE, however, remains the broadest Pan-European forum to conduct dialogue on the strengthening of security in the Euro-Atlantic region and is developing its mechanisms of applying "soft" guarantees of security in the form of preventive diplomacy and action in crisis situations. Its purposefulness is especially evident in Central Europe, in the Balkans and post-Soviet areas.

In effect, the to-date development of European security institutionalisation shows an increased tendency to build an asymmetric and multilayered structure in which the "hard core" is the reforming NATO, together with the formed European Identity of Security and Defence (fixed, on the one hand, in the European Union, and on the other, in NATO – as its "European pillar"), and the outer, "soft" housing – the sub-system of expanded mechanisms of cooperation of NATO, WEU and EU with the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin²⁸.

²⁷ A. Kozyriev, *The Lagging Partnership*, "Foreign Affairs" Vol. 73 (1994), No. 3, pp. 65–66; E. Decaux, *CSCE Institutional Issues at the Budapest Conference*, "Helsinki Monitor" Vol. 5 (1994), No. 3, pp. 18–26; T. Kokkinides, *L'OSCE: une opportunité perdue pour la sécurité européenne?*, "Relations Internationales et Stratégiques" n° 18, été 1995, pp.92–93.

²⁸ Some Western authors on the basis of analysis of NATO expansion draw a theoretical conclusion on the creation of a "multilevel" system of security guarantees for countries of Central and Eastern Europe. See K. Mueller, *Patterns of Alliance: Alignment Balancing and Stability in Eastern Europe*, "Security Studies" Vol. 5 (1995), No. 1, p. 71; M.M. Balmaceda, *Institutions, Alliances and Stability: Thinking Theoretically about International Relations in Central-East Europe*, "European Security" Vol. 6 (1997), No. 3, pp. 100–101.

In the second half of the 1990s Western institutions began the implementation of the cautious strategy of enlargement to new members from the group of partnership countries. A significant change was taking place in the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in Europe. On 12 March 1999 NATO accepted three Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; other candidates have the opportunity to receive a similar "premium" of joining the North Atlantic Alliance once they meet the terms and conditions set in the "NATO Enlargement Study", this however will depend on the whole of future cooperation of countries for security in the Euro-Atlantic region, especially on how relations between the enlarged NATO and Russia develop. The chances are good, as the North Atlantic Alliance is declaring the continuation of its open policy towards the aspirations of the remaining Central European countries and NATO-Russia cooperation – although not without flaws – is developing as a strategic partnership. The effect of the tendency to create asymmetry of security guarantees in the Euro-Atlantic region is, on the one hand – further strengthening of Western structures and their enlargement to new members from Central Europe, and on the other hand – the ongoing lack of a full sense of security in the countries remaining outside those structures and their fear of remaining in an area of greater risk. The majority of these countries do not see a real alternative to seeking their security in guarantees and cooperation with Western institutions.

One can concede to the argument expressed by the German expert who insists that the often quoted concept of *interlocking institutions*, which claims to promote regular interaction between current security and European cooperation mechanisms (NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE) is in fact exclusively oriented towards the domination of NATO, and as proof of this thesis he cites the provision in the "NATO Enlargement Study" (pt. 15) where we read that OSCE will be assisting in winning over states which perhaps will never join the North Atlantic Alliance²⁹.

NATO's enlargement to Central European countries caused a considerable stir in most political circles in Moscow; there is a persistent uneasiness there that this might exclude Russia from the enlargement process of an integrating Europe. There is, the so-called, Versailles syndrome which brings back memories of hostility of the Entente countries towards Bolshevik Russia. Moscow's main point of argument is a traditional view of NATO as a politico-military block which, taking advantage of Russia's internal weakness "is approaching its borders"³⁰. Thus, we are dealing primarily with the issue of perception and trust

²⁹ M. Schmidt, *Reflections on a New Architecture of European Security*, "Peace and Security" Vol. 29 (1997), p. 3.

³⁰ See O.N. Bykov, *Cooperation or Self Isolation: NATO Syndrome in the Russian Policy*, "Peace and Security" Vol. 29 (1997), pp. 1–5; J.P. Bazhanov, *Evolution of the Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s*, "Review of International Affairs" No. 1063/64, 15 XII 1997 – 15 I 1998, pp. 18, 22;

of the declared and realised by Western countries internal transformation of the Alliance. The majority of Russian politicians and experts view negatively the mere fact of the West's different approach to the countries of Central Europe and Russia; in their view, Russia is made light of and approached from the position of power³¹, and after Central European countries joined NATO, was even isolated. Meanwhile Russia – as Siergiej Karaganov writes – for historical, political, geostrategic and cultural reasons has a vital interest in being part of the Pan-European security system³². The gist of the matter is that Russian politicians and experts have a different view from that held by most Western states of the ways of achieving this goal and that is by endorsing the concept of a strengthened OSCE.

Western states and Alliance candidates try to dispel Russia's fears insisting that NATO's enlargement should not be viewed in terms of expansion for spheres of influence, but is aimed at strengthening the security of its new members, as well as Russia and other countries in the region³³ as well as enlarging the "area of democracy and stability" in Europe, which should have a positive effect on the consolidation of democratic forces in Russia and other CIS countries. This in turn should assist the development of political and economic cooperation of CIS countries with the West and improve their ties with Western security institutions. Russia and other countries that are not considered by NATO and the European Union in their plans of enlargement are offered – considered as insufficient by those countries – bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation in matters of security. The majority of Western authors believe that it is in the vital interest of the West to convince Russia to continue its democratic and market reforms, and to provide assistance in the coming difficult period, so that it could achieve the "institutionalised form of an open society"³⁴.

A very important challenge facing NATO today is finding the solution to the issue of whether the Alliance should stop at accepting new members from Central Europe³⁵ or proceed further and accept Russia, and also – how to trans-

D. Averre, *NATO Expansion and Russian National Interest*, "European Security" Vol. 7 (1998), No. 1, pp. 10–54.

³¹ N.A. Kosolapow, *Mieniajuszcziasja Rossija i strategija Zapada*, In: *Rosija i buduszczeje jeropejskoje ustrojstwo*. Ed. N.A. Kosolapow, Moskwa 1995, pp. 259–260.

³² Interview with Siergiej Karaganow, "Przegląd Środkoweuropski" 1995, No. 12/13, pp. 91–94. See also S.N. MacFarlane, *Russia, the West and European Security*, "Survival" Vol. 35 (1993), No. 3, p. 19.

³³ Ch.L. Ball, *Nattering NATO negativism? Reasons why expansion may be a good thing*, "Review of International Studies" Vol. 1 (1998), No. 1, pp. 43–67.

³⁴ See, e.g. the opinion of a retired Princeton University professor Robert C. Tucker: *Russia and the West: From Cold War to Cold Peace*, In: Michael Kraus, Ronald D. Liebowitz (eds.), *Russia and Eastern Europe After Communism: The Search for New Political, Economic, and Security Systems*, Boulder, Colo. 1996, pp. 292–294.

³⁵ See arguments for this option: M. McGwire, *NATO expansion: "a policy error of historic importance"*, "Review of International Studies" Vol. 24 (1998), No. 1, pp. 23–41.

form it from a narrow organisation restricted to collective security into something more, that hasn't yet been articulated fully, but already has the signs of a "yet unclear in concept and unfinished organisation of collective security"³⁶.

Only but a handful of authors, including those who used to be opposed to NATO expansion for fear that the process would lead Russia to choose the "Cold Peace" scenario, are now in favour of the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance to the remaining countries of the eastern part of Europe, including Russia³⁷.

Meanwhile OSCE, being a Pan-European institution, is unable to balance the asymmetry of security between the western part of Europe and its eastern part and adjacent areas. Russia's efforts on the other hand to lead the formation of a regional security system of CIS states on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty are not producing the intended results. The simple truth is that the former Soviet states see it as an instrument to the revival of Moscow's imperial policies, not the modern institution founded, similarly as NATO or the European Union, on democratic principles and capable of coping with new challenges and threats.

All this helps maintain an awareness of insufficient security guarantees for many former socialist countries; this however does not pose a new threat to the stability in the Euro-Atlantic region but is rather a stimulant to seek new concepts of institutionalisation of the European order, thus, this institutionalisation is a dynamic, ongoing process and its results are difficult to foresee. They will surely depend on the development of relations between the leading actors on the Euro-Atlantic scene, i.e. the USA, the European Union and Russia, as well as on whether the United States will seize the opportunity to maintain their current unquestionable position of the sole global superpower³⁸. Undoubtedly, the enlargement of NATO increases their chances for this and at the same time indicates the main "asymmetric" direction of evolution of the European order.

It can, thus, be said that the domination of Western security structures in Europe leads to the formation of a new international balance which expands the area of stability and security, and provides an opportunity of partnership cooperation to states with similar aspirations or a different vision of world order. This newly emerging balance, which Gerard Ruggie calls "cooperative

³⁶ J.C. Garnett, *European security after the Cold War*. In: M.J. Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Period*, Cheltenham 1996, pp. 37-38.

³⁷ See, e.g. J.L. Gaddis, *History, grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement*, "Survival" Vol. 40 (1998), No. 1, pp. 150-151.

³⁸ Zbigniew Brzeziński writes on the subject in his book: *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Implications*, New York 1997. On the subject of Russia's future geopolitical role see Russian authors: W.S. Kowalkin, *Rossija w nowych geopolityczeskich realiach na progie XXI wieka*, Moskwa 1996; A. Dugin, *Osnovy Gieopolitiki. Gieopolityczeskoje budusczieje Rossi*, Moskwa 1997, pp. 179-490.

balancing"³⁹, is based on changed geopolitics. This, in turn, is the result of Western victory over the Eastern block in their Cold War competition, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the start of deep democratisation processes in the former socialist countries. There remain, however, the unresolved issues concerning the functioning and evolution of the new European order, such as: equal security in conditions of security institution pluralism, equal opportunity to participate on the international arena, increased effectiveness in providing international stability and providing a correlation between the development of democracy, on the one hand, and the stability of peace and international security, on the other.

5.2. Final remarks

Analysis of the transformation of the European security system after the Cold War indicates that we are dealing with a formation process of a new structure of international order involving the participation of 55 member states of OSCE in the extensive Euro-Atlantic area encompassing a large area in the Northern Hemisphere. The dominant tendency is the strengthening and expansion of strong, democratic and tested institutions established as a result of increased political partnership and integration processes between Western states (NATO, WUE & UE). They are supplemented by Pan-European structures (OSCE, European Council), the Commonwealth of Independent States and several sub-regional groups. This institutional pluralism, in association with the dominant, on the European arena, concept of cooperative security, does not constitute a weakness of the constructed security system, to the contrary – it represents its democratic character which enables the growth of individual parts of the continent (sub-regions) until they're ready to join the most effective structures, and at the same time stimulates the adaptation of those structures to new tasks and closer cooperation with partners outside those structures.

Still questionable and open to dispute is the issue of the potential enlargement of Western institutions to all OSCE member states. There are still no signs in those countries of sufficient political will to build a new security system in Europe, based on one regional organisation established either on the basis of OSCE or in any other way, for example as a result of the transformation of any other institution operating in the Euro-Atlantic region. The asymmetry of security guarantees remains between the western and eastern parts of Europe as well as the neighbouring areas of former Soviet states of Central Asia. This

³⁹ J.G. Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era*, New York 1996, pp. 103–106. In the author's view "cooperative balancing" is an advanced form of cooperative security.

asymmetry remains the basic element of uncertainty as to the further evolution of the institutionalisation of European security.

In conclusion, it needs to be stated that the new European order is and can proceed to be constructed only by degrees. Successive stages of its further institutionalisation will mainly depend, as up to now, on the one hand – on the progress of democratic processes in Central and Eastern European states as well as in Russia and other post-Soviet states, and on the other – the development of the processes of European integration and trans-Atlantic relations. This will assist economic growth and stability in countries undergoing transformation, their opening up to international cooperation and development of trans-national ties, it will increase the certainty of their foreign and security policies, increase international interdependence and increase international cooperation and develop multilateral institutions. The new European peace order, although its final shape is impossible to predict, should evolve as a continuation of current tendencies in the social, economic and political development of states and international institutions of the whole Euro-Atlantic region, an area stretching from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”.